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The function of the mass media in the democratic process is crucial to an informed public 
and vital to a democratic system. One primary role of the media is that of gatekeeper 
between political candidates and the public. The influence the media has on the electorate 
is heightened during the primary process of presidential elections and even more so in the 
pre-primary season when a large majority of potential voters have yet to form opinions of 
candidates. The effects of the media in the pre-primary season of politics play out in 
significant relationships where media coverage results in measurable increases in 
campaign contributions to the candidates included in this research, while the tone of 
content has no measurable influence. Although models that tested the ability to predict 
success in primaries failed to reach statistically significant levels, the raw data show high 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
It is widely accepted in the study of political science that the media consortium of 
television, print and, more recently, the internet has a credible influence on how candidates 
for president of the United States are perceived by voters (Patterson 1980). However, most 
of the existing research tends to focus its analyses in one of three ways: on the election 
cycle broadly, specifically on the primaries, or solely on the general election season. And by 
merely seeking to determine the existence of such influence, most—if not all—stop short of 
quantifying the possible effects the influence of the media may have on election outcomes 
with any sort of predictive model. Consequently, the available research fails to grasp the 
significance that the mass media has on, not simply influencing the elections, but to the 
extent that it actually possesses the power to pick winners and losers. Of particular concern 
here is the gap in research that fails to provide such a model based on specific analysis of 
media effects in the pre-primary season—referred to by some as the “media primary” 
(Project for Excellence in Journalism 2011), “invisible primary” (Hadley 1976; Haynes, 
Flowers, Gurian 2002) or “viability primary” (Dowdle, Adkins and Steger 2009).  
This paper analyzes the influence the mass media has on the electorate in the pre-
primary process of United States presidential elections from 1988 through 2012 and 
attempts to quantify its predictive power. The question this paper seeks to answer is 
whether the media influence voter perception of a candidate to the extent that such 
influence affects the outcome of an election. By analyzing quantity and tone of media 
coverage of declared candidates during the pre-primary phase, a logistical regression 
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model will test to determine if there exists a quantifiable value of such influence. This value 
is measured in terms of the likelihood of success in the candidates’ respective party 
primary in New Hampshire, historically the first primary in the nation. Multiple control 
variables will attempt to reduce the possibility of any spurious relationships. Furthermore, 
a lagged time analysis of the data will provide a means of reducing the potential for 
endogeneity between multiple factors that commonly contribute to success in the pre-
primary process. This method comports with the methodology of prior work (Dowdle, 





CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Before any research of media influence in the election process can begin, it is 
necessary to identify the key actors in this relationship and understand their functions. Of 
particular importance to this paper are three elements:  the presidential candidates, the 
electorate, and the New Hampshire primary. A review of existing literature will explain 
each component’s peculiar function within the context of its relationship to the others and, 
most importantly, to the media.   
 
2.1 The Candidates 
Candidates seeking their respective party’s nomination for president begin the 
political cycle with varying degrees of political capital—whether that is expressed in 
experience, name recognition, party support, or financial resources. Regardless of how 
much political capital a candidate enjoys, there are specific goals that must be attained 
during the pre-primary process. Dowdle, Adkins, and Steger (2009) focus specifically on 
this pre-primary season of the election cycle and analyze the characteristics of the 
candidates in their quest for nomination. They note the peculiarity of the process in which 
party identification [highly significant in voter choice (preference), Campbell, et al. (1960)] 
is of no value, in that all candidates are of the same party (Dowdle, Adkins, Steger 2009, 
78). The result of this situation is that candidates must find other means by which they can 
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differentiate themselves from other candidates, with the goal of creating an image of 
viability.  
Additionally, candidates must find the proper balance between presenting their 
position on issues and their personal image. Choi and Lee (2007) note that “in the initial 
stage of impression formation for political figures, image information plays a more 
significant role than issue information” (61). Furthermore, they attribute this focus on 
candidate image to the "visual medium” of television (61). This can be related to the fact 
that low levels of information about the candidates exist in the pre-primary season due to 
the absence of party identification and often, the lack of general familiarity with the 
candidates. As Buell (1991) notes, during this early election season “…citizens [know] and 
[care] the least about candidates and issues” (150).  
Arterton notes that campaigns may influence the way in which the media frame 
issues (1997, 193). However, Petrocik adds a caveat to this conclusion in that, “…each 
depends on the other to accomplish its objectives” (1984, 198). This creates a predicament 
for the candidate whereby they are beholden to the media for press coverage, all the while 
knowing that invariably the media has ultimate control over the framing of that coverage. 
Bartels (1985) found that expectations of candidates’ success had a greater effect on voters’ 
perceptions only in early primary states as compared to later primaries. Under these 
circumstances, a candidate will seek out the media to facilitate the process of acquiring this 
political capital in the hopes that it will translate to electoral success during the primaries 




2.2 The Electorate 
In a democratic election, what ultimately matters are the decisions that voters make 
in choosing candidates for office. As such, understanding how voters respond to various 
forms of stimuli—how they absorb, acknowledge, and react to political information—is 
essential to producing an accurate explanation of how the media influences their political 
decision-making processes. What the existing research finds is, as Flanigan and Zingale 
(2010) note, an “impressionable electorate” during the early election season (179). Similar 
to Buell’s (1991) uninterested electorate, Flanigan and Zingale attribute a vulnerable 
electorate to the reality that voters have few pre-conceived attitudes about the candidates 
during the primary – and to a greater extent during the pre-primary (199). The result is 
that the impact of new information tends to be greatest during such early phases of the 
election cycle as compared to the later phases when attitudes and perceptions about 
candidates become more established. 
Within the context of the pre-primary phase of the election, the effects of the media 
are intensified since the public must rely on such functions as priming, gatekeeping and 
agenda setting to provide distinguishing information regarding the myriad candidates 
(Belt, Just, and Crigler 2012; Dowdle, Adkins, and Steger 2009; Patterson 1980). The 
media’s priming function consists of “attending to some problems while ignoring others” 
(Iyengar, Peters and Kinder 1982, 849). The gatekeeping function is defined as “a 
distribution function…with which media select and present stories across a range of tone” 
(Soroka 2012, 514). The term “agenda setting” represents a collective function that broadly 
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defines how the media determine what the public “takes to be important” (Iyengar, Peters 
and Kinder 1982, 848). 
Highlighting content that is “sensational…unusual…and conflictual” over stories that 
are less so provides a blunt, although accurate, characterization of how the media acts as a 
facilitator of information from candidate to electorate (Soroka 2012, 514). But as Patterson 
(1993) notes, “substantive policy issues, even when covered, are subordinated to the 
drama of the conflict generated between the opposing sides. In this sense, the press 
‘depoliticizes’ issues, treating them more as election ritual than as objects of serious 
debate” (137).  
The effects of the media on the electorate are the focus of Choi and Lee (2007). 
Among other aspects, Choi and Lee measure the effect of positive/negative ordering of 
news broadcasts on viewers’ opinions. Participants were subjected to various news stories 
consisting of both positive and negative tone. These were alternated in an attempt to 
measure whether first stories (primacy effect) were more memorable than secondary 
stories (recency effect). The authors conclude that negative stories “…stand out, and 
therefore [are] much more likely to be noticed and processed by the viewing public, 
regardless of the primacy/recency factor” (Choi and Lee 2007, 48). Furthermore, this effect 
is so strong that negative exposures are roughly five to 10 times as effective as positive 
exposures in that, a negative story affected the viewer’s opinion of a candidate after only 
one or two viewings, whereas a positive story required anywhere from five to 10 viewings 
prior to an effect on opinion (Guskind and Hagstrom 1988).  
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Finally, negative impressions are likely to be indelible (Cusumano and Richey 1970) 
and more credible (Zanna and Hamilton1972) than positive impressions. The prevalence of 
negative over positive messaging is not transient, either. Choi and Lee (2007) reference 
Richey, McClelland, and Shimkuna (1967) who found that, after more than a week, the 
effects of negative stories prevailed over positive ones, again regardless of the order in 
which participants viewed them. 
Also of importance is that the salience of particular issues varies from election to 
election. The most obvious examples of these include current events, either foreign or 
domestic. However, of perhaps greater influence is what particular events the media deems 
pertinent as measured by the quantity of time dedicated to reporting on the subject or 
issue (Iyengar, Peters and Kinder 1982). Foreign affairs as well as domestic issues can help 
to frame the atmosphere of a campaign, but only to the extent that the media insists on 
dwelling on the issue (Belt, Just, and Crigler 2012). 
Perhaps of more significance than any outside influence is the voter’s individual 
desire to pick a winner. As Mutz (1995) points out, the strategic voter theory argues that a 
voter has a tendency to support a viable candidate. Viability simple refers to whether a 
candidate is perceived by someone to have a chance of winning an election. It is not too 
much of a stretch then to conclude that such viable candidates will also receive the lion’s 
share of financial support as well in that, voters who will donate to political candidates 
would be expected to donate to viable candidates as well. In fact, previous studies have 
found that result (Dowdle, Adkins and Steger 2009; Kenny 1993; Stone, Rappaport and 
Atkeson 1995). Furthermore, Mutz (1995) describes this as a process of “strategic 
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contributing.” This process, therefore, assumes that media impressions determining who 
are viable candidates would one variable that affects voters’ financial support, polling 
preferences, and who the voters will ultimately support, reversing the causal arrow of 
much of the existing literature that argues in favor of a neutral, reactive media that merely 
follow the story instead of creating it (Paolino 1996; Steger 2000).  
Cohen (1963, 16) sums up the role of the media when he notes that “…the mass 
media may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but the media 
are stunningly successful in telling their audience what to think about.” The roles of the 
media as gatekeeper (controlling the flow of information), agenda-setter (elevating 
particular stories/issues over others) and framing (setting the context and value of 
stories/issues) are intertwined in a way that results in conferring on the public an altered 
view of candidates, issues, and policy preferences (Lippmann 1922; Patterson 1980).  
 
2.3 The New Hampshire Primary 
In testing the effects of the media in the pre-primary season, it is important to 
understand the critical role that the New Hampshire primaries play. First, New Hampshire 
is (and continues to be) the first primary to take place. And, while it is preceded by the 
Iowa caucus, New Hampshire tends to reflect both a more democratic process and a more 
representative electorate in that, as Norrander (1993; 2006) notes, caucuses “tend to favor 
ideologically extreme candidates” (344) and tend to be “complicated” and “unpredictable” 
(495). Furthermore, those participating in caucuses tend to be more partisan and 
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ideological (Stone, Abramowitz and Rappaport 1989), with the event itself having been 
described as “…principally fundraisers with voting restricted to ticket holders” (Buell, Jr. 
1996, 20). While, on the other hand, Orren and Polsby (1987, 5) conclude that New 
Hampshire primary voters are in line “demographically” as well as “attitudinally” with the 
national party members. Even those who doubt New Hampshire’s demographic 
generalizations affix significant weight to the influence its primary has on long-term 
election predictions (Adkins and Dowdle 2000, 258). Such conclusions appear to give 
credence to the anecdotal notion that “Iowa picks corn, and New Hampshire picks 
presidents” (Hull 2005, 8). 
Furthermore, the McGovern-Fraser reforms of the 1970s were implemented with 
the goal of stabilizing the nominating conventions and providing a more cohesive primary 
process. Ultimately, these reforms have placed more influence on the primaries—to the 
point that now more than 40 states use the primary, accounting for over 80 percent of the 
total convention delegates (Norrander 2010, 19-20). Patterson (1980) notes that the 
changing role of the media has been fostered by these structural changes in the election 
process as well. He points out—as do others (e.g. Key, 1964; Epstein, 1986)—that the 
advent of the primary shifted the influence of the nominating process from the party 
leaders to the electorate. The role of the media enhanced this process by providing a direct 
link between the candidates and the voters. Thus, any successful candidate will devote 
most, if not all, of his or her time pursuing the necessary media outlets that afford them the 
greatest amount of coverage (Patterson 1980).  
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Finally, previous research has shown that media coverage does, in fact, have a 
significant effect on voter preferences in New Hampshire. For instance, Farnsworth and 
Lichter (2003), in showing such an effect in the 2000 Democratic primary,  point to similar 
effects in the New Hampshire primaries of 1980, 1992, and 1996 (597). Furthermore, this 
relationship appears to follow the bandwagon effect, wherein positive coverage leads to 
increased support—especially as regards horse race coverage, wherein the media focus 
solely on who is leading and who is trailing in the polls (Bartels 1985). This effect is 
magnified in light of the tendency of television media to focus on such horse race coverage 
(Buhr 2001).  
2.4 “Dynamic Momentum”1 
One vital issue of the pre-primary season that must be addressed prior to any 
predictive analysis is the potential for an endogenous relationship between the three 
primary actors during this phase of the election: money, media and existing voter 
preference. Such an attempt at causal ordering is inherently subject to endogeneity (van 
der Eijk 2002, 197). As Arterton (1984, 25) explains, “dynamic momentum”  refers to the 
notion that higher levels of name recognition can invite more media coverage which then 
leads to greater recognition, leading to greater support, which ultimately leads to greater 
financial support—and the process repeats itself. But there exists no definitive explanation, 
theoretically or empirically, for which of these actors precedes the others in beginning this 
process. This is a crucial point to determine since subsequent hypotheses presume the 
                                                        
1 See Arterton (1984). 
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effects on primary outcomes are created by the media. If media coverage is a result of 
increases in campaign fundraising, then the forthcoming analysis may suffer from 
autocorrelation and/or endogeneity problems.  
Supporting the theory that the media act as the genesis of this dynamic momentum, 
Dowdle, Adkins, Steger (2009, 84) find that a candidates’ support in national Gallup polls in 
a given quarter is significantly related to the volume of network news coverage in the 
previous quarter. In addition, they find that, after controlling for prior levels of public 
support, network news coverage of the candidates has the second greatest effect on public 
support for candidates. And while it might be inferred that public opinion is the spark that 
lights the fire, it is important to understand that, in low information settings such as pre-
primary phases of elections, public information is provided by the media (Lippmann 1922; 
Patterson 1980; McCombs and Estrada 1997).  
Furthermore, Mutz (1995, 1018) applies the strategic voter theory to the 
fundraising process in the sense that would-be donors may be inclined to give to “viable” 
candidates – as determined through “horse race” coverage. This cognitive effect should 
exist even more so in crowded, low-awareness pre-primaries where “information conveyed 
about candidates through the news media takes on greater import” (Dowdle, Adkins, Steger 
2009, 85). Perhaps the most striking evidence for the media’s causal role comes from 
Donovan and Hunsaker (2009, 48) who found that, with respect to outcomes in Iowa 
caucuses, “when press attention to candidates is used to estimate results, the effects of 
money are eliminated, and the effects of poll standing disappeared.” 
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Existing research points to a relationship among the media, the electorate, and the 
candidates that suggests fertile ground for influencing voters’ perceptions of candidates. 
Low information settings with a media that, in essence have a monopoly on the flow of 
information, result in presidential candidates being reliant upon such media for conveying 
their messages to the electorate. The fact that the electorate is highly impressionable 
during the early stages of the election cycle exacerbates the influence that the media has—
especially since voters tend to seek out viable candidates whom they can support with their 
votes and their wallets. These realities suggest that such influence could have a measurable 




CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESES 
The literature provides ample support to suggest numerous theories of the 
interaction among the principal factors at work during the pre-primary phase of 
presidential elections. First, the relationship between media coverage and campaign 
contributions implies a strategic donor theory, which asserts that voters tend to donate to a 
candidate who they deem has the best chance of winning.2 Therefore, it is hypothesized 
that: 
H₁: An increase in the volume of media coverage of a candidate will result in an 
increase in campaign contributions in the concurrent quarter of the year 
Furthermore, as noted previously, low-information settings create a structure 
whereby the media provide the vast majority of information to the electorate about the 
candidates. The second relationship supported by the literature suggests a strategic voter 
theory such that: 
H₂: An increase in the volume of media coverage of a candidate will result in an 
increase in a candidate’s support as measured by polling percentage 
The first two hypotheses are tested in Model 1.  
While the literature provides clear and substantive evidence for the existence of an 
impact of media on voter behavior, it stops short of addressing the most critical question: 
Do the media provide a measurable effect on the outcomes of presidential elections? In 
light of the dependence of candidates upon the media, the perceived credibility of negative 
                                                        
2 Mutz (1995, 1018) refers to this person as a “strategic contributor.” 
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voter impressions of candidates (Cusumano and Richey 1970), and a highly impressionable 
electorate (Belt, Just, and Crigler 2012), the following is hypothesized: 
H₃: The greater the positive rating (tone) of media coverage for a candidate during 
the pre-primary season, the greater the candidate’s chance of winning their respective 
party’s New Hampshire primary 
Additionally, or perhaps alternately, the quantity of media coverage could have a 
significant impact on success, regardless of the tone (Benoit, Hemmer, and Stein 2010).  
Therefore, the following is hypothesized: 
H₄: The greater the total volume of media coverage regarding a candidate, the 
greater the candidate’s chance of winning their respective party’s New Hampshire primary 
These hypotheses are tested in Model 2. 
The results of Model 1 are necessarily applied to the analysis conducted in Model 2. 
This is required due to the potential spuriousness that would result if not previously 
addressing the possible endogeneity within Model 1. Mere correlation among media 
coverage, money raised and poll results does not provide a causal relationship. Simply put, 
whatever variable is determined to be the primary causal factor in Model 1 would 
necessarily be considered (and tested as) the primary causal factor in Model 2. Again, 





CHAPTER 4: DATA AND METHODS 
Using data from the Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism 
(PEJ), the Center for Media and Public Affairs (CMPA) and Vanderbilt University’s 
Television News Archive, media coverage data were obtained showing total volume of 
coverage as well as positive and negative tone of the coverage of candidates.3 Tone is 
measured as the net positive (or negative) score across the entire timeframe of coverage.4  
Using the Federal Election Commission’s website (fec.gov), data were obtained for 
each of the included candidate’s quarterly fundraising totals during the year immediately 
prior to each election year.5 For this analysis, quarterly reports from April, July and October 
were used. There are two reasons for using these reports in the model. First, they provide 
for a consistent measurement of creating lagged variables for the regression. The FEC 
requires any declared candidate to report campaign finances on a quarterly basis. Second, 
these reports are publicly reported and are used as a means to measure the “horse race” 
evolving during this early process. Quarterly reports represent measurements of the 
viability of a candidate from one quarter to the next. 
While opinions differ on the exact time frame for calculating this pre-primary 
season, most subscribe to using varying lengths of time that incorporate all or part of the 
                                                        
3 Sources varied from year to year, but are representative of overall coverage at the time. Sources include 
ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN and, when available, FOX News. 
 
4 For tonal measure, Pew employs Crimson Hexagon, a computer coding software which categorizes stories as 
positive, negative, or neutral (PEJ 2011). This system has resulted in a 97% accuracy rate when compared to 
human coding. 
  
5 Total contributions (line 17a on form 3P). 
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year immediately preceding an election year (Norrander 2010; Mutz 1995; Collingwood et. 
al 2012). For the purposes of this analysis, the pre-primary season will be operationalized 
as beginning on April 15 of the year prior to the election year and concluding with the New 
Hampshire primaries in January of the election year. The rationale for this 
operationalization of the time parameters is two-fold. First, regarding campaign funds, the 
required quarterly reporting by the FEC allows for consistent data sets across all election 
years when performing the necessary time series regressions. The last six months (third 
and fourth quarters) of the year provide the quarter-to-quarter lagged variables leading up 
to the New Hampshire primary. Measuring poll preferences prior to the April 15 FEC 
deadline (first quarter), along with measuring media coverage beginning the day of 
disclosure, provides a starting point for analyzing the causal process. Therefore, media 
coverage measured from one reporting date to the next can be directly tied to the 
candidates’ support in polls and financial disclosures. Second, regarding candidate activity, 
this timeframe accounts for what can be considered the active campaigning phase of the 
pre-primary season and better captures later entry candidates (Haynes, Flowers, Gurian 
2002, 636). 
The elections occurring between 1988 and 2012 were selected for two reasons. 
First, the structure of the data used limited the analysis to these elections.6 Valid 
comparable data for the positive/negative content analysis as well as the quantity of 
coverage necessarily limited the data to this time frame. Any data collected for earlier 
                                                        
6 FEC data for elections prior to 1992 are available on microfilm at the Federal Election Commission 
headquarters in Washington, D.C. All other data are available online at www.fec.gov.  
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election cycles would risk the validity of the results as alternate means of measuring 
content tone would have to be obtained from sources different than the three used here.  
Second, notwithstanding the previous limitation, this timeframe allows for a broad 
collection of primary circumstances which provide for a more thorough analysis. 
Specifically, the data include election years wherein the primaries (1992 and 2004) are 
Democrat-only (Republican incumbent), two (1996 and 2012) are Republican-only 
(Democrat incumbent), and three (1988, 2000 and 2008) have both parties staging 
primaries (no incumbent). This provides an inherent control for the argument of some 
(Agnew 1969a, 1969b; Efron 1971; Keely 1971; Bozell and Baker 1990; Bozell 1992) for 
the existence of a partisan media bias. Essentially, by providing data that include all three 
partisan scenarios, the results of the analysis will test, if present, any discrepancy of the 
hypothesized relationships between Republican and Democratic candidates. The popular 
theory of the existence of a liberal bias in the media is a separate empirical question that 
requires a thorough analysis independently. However, the results here may provide a 
starting point for such research. 
For this analysis, the number of cases was determined by including all candidates 
who met the following conditions: they were officially declared candidates by filing with 
the FEC; they submitted financial statements for at least two quarters of the year prior to 
election year; and, they earned at least one percent of the New Hampshire primary vote. 
This resulted in a total of 50 presidential candidates. Those candidates who do not meet all 
three characteristics were excluded, because accurate financial data are not available for 
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these candidates, making valid analysis of their results impossible. Similarly, third party 
candidates were not included since a primary contest was not available for analysis. 
The first two hypotheses suggest a causal relationship between media coverage and 
contributions (H₁) as well as between media coverage and voter preference—as measured 
by support in polls (H₂). The first concern regarding these variables is the high potential for 
endogeneity. One prevailing theory holds that media coverage simply follows as an effect of 
poll preference and fundraising (Steger 2000). In essence, the media merely report what is 
newsworthy—likely “horse race” coverage. First, a Pearson’s correlation will be performed 
among these three variables. Donovan and Hunsaker (2009, 48) have shown in similar 
research that these statistics tend to range between .53 and .63.7 Model 1 will consist of a 
correlation such that:   
  
 (    ) (  )(  )(  )
√      (  )        (  )         (  )  
                                                           ( 1 ) 
Where x = volume of media coverage 
 y = financial contributions 
 z = voter support (polls) 
Following the correlation, a two-stage least squares regression will be performed 
that measures the effect of media coverage on both campaign funds and public opinion. 
This specification is based on the potential of the violation of OLS assumptions (such as 
reciprocal causation) between the variables and potential for selection bias as only 
                                                        
7 Donovan and Hunsaker (2009) performed logistic regression to estimate success in Iowa caucuses 
measuring poll preference, campaign contributions and media coverage. 
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candidates who earned a minimum share of the vote are included in the analysis. Model 1 
will consist of a two-stage least squares regression such that: 
y = β₀ + β₁(x₁) + β₂(x₂) + β₃(x₃) + e                                                                          ( 2 ) 
Where: x₁ = Media coverage (volume), 
  x₂ = Campaign funds, 
  x₃ = Voter support (polls) 
Step 1 regresses X₁ (the endogenous variable) such that: 
for campaign funds:   ₂̂   y₀ + y₁(z₁) +e ( 3 ) 
for voter support: :   ₃̂   y₀ + y₁(z₁) +e ( 4 ) 
Where: z1 = x1(t-1) (the instrumental variable - lagged) 
 
Step 2 regresses the new values of   ₂ and   ₃ such that: 
y = β₀ + β₁(x₁) + β₂(  ₂) + β₃(  ₃) + e ( 5 ) 
Several notes regarding the data and methods here are important. First, because 
many of the assumptions here are not testable, such recursive models “rarely, if 
ever…result in an unambiguous, unique causal” relationship (James and Singh 1978, 1105). 
This is due to the limitations on non-experimental data such as the absence of non-
treatment subjects. Second, following Bolens (1996), the instrumental variable is required 
to possess two primary characteristics: 1) that it is correlated with x₁ and 2) that it is 
uncorrelated with both y₁ and y₂ (110).  
Once the model 1 results are estimated, they will be applied to the model 2 
regression. To reiterate, high levels of endogeneity among the model 1 variables could 
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distort the empirical findings of model 2. Having addressed the endogeneity in model 1, 
model 2 will consist of a logistical regression analysis, measuring media coverage tone as 
well as media volume on vote totals in the New Hampshire primary.  
However, it would be careless and naïve to assert that either an overabundance of 
positively toned news coverage or sheer volume of media coverage could in and of itself 
provide the means for primary success. Undoubtedly, other factors are at play. Each 
election provides inherently peculiar aspects that may limit the generalizability of the 
results. Therefore, several other potential factors must be addressed and controlled if a 
valid measure of the impact of the media is to be obtained. These factors include name 
recognition, previous public service (Dowdle, Adkins, and Steger 2009, 81), and the 
occurrence of scandals and/or controversies that may derail a candidacy regardless of 
one’s relative standing in the polls (Kahn and Kenney 2002). Furthermore, the popular 
“liberal media bias” charge could also have an effect in this type of analysis (Bozell 1992). 
Therefore, the model will also control for party identification.   
In light of these factors, Gallup measured name recognition of candidates early in 
their respective campaigns.8 Some candidates start out as frontrunners merely because 
high name recognition gives them an aura of viability compared to others (Abramson et al. 
1992; Mutz 1997; Haynes et al. 2004; Dowdle, Adkins, and Steger 2009). Thus, initial name 
recognition could foster news coverage as the mass media deem low-recognition 
candidates non-viable from the outset (Dowdle, Adkins, and Steger 2009).  
                                                        
8 Name recognition is measured as the percentage of respondents who report having heard about the 
candidate. Polls were taken at differing points for each election; however, all were recorded prior to July’s 
FEC disclosures as well as any media coverage data recorded here.  
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Additionally, the possibility of a candidate’s previous public service could 
potentially skew the perception of media bias for or against a candidate as well as allowing 
the more “skillful campaigners to capture more media attention” (Kahn and Kenny 2002, 
383). While this could be construed as having a collinear relationship with name 
recognition, it is important to note that image information is significantly important during 
the initial phase of creating an impression (Choi and Lee 2007). For example, an 
experienced congressperson could be relatively unknown on a national scale, providing 
him (or her) with a still formative image, while a celebrity candidate, with no previous 
political experience, most likely enters the race with high name recognition and, 
subsequently, little room for maneuvering on image. Therefore, prior service as an elected 
official and name recognition must be treated as separate factors.  
The final variable for which a control is required is the effect that controversies and 
scandals have on a candidate’s viability. This measure can be a cause for concern as such a 
variable has no universally accepted metric, especially in light of framing actions of the 
media and political elites (Woessner 2005, 104). Scandals are often subjective in their 
severity, even to the extent that they are considered scandals at all. However, for the 
purposes of this analysis, a scandal is operationalized in accordance with the existing 
literature on the subject, broadly defining it as “accusations of misconduct…of a personal 
nature” (Woessner 2005, 96). Therefore, the variable of scandal will be assigned to any 
candidate against whom an accusation arises that concerns personal conduct and garners 
sufficient media coverage as to result in a candidate’s explicit and direct response to the 
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allegations (Peters and Welch 1980; Abramowitz 1988, 1991; Krosnick and Kinder 1990; 
Dimock and Jacobson 1995; Woessner 2005).  
Because the final two hypotheses (H₃ and H₄) enlist a dichotomous dependent 
variable (electoral success), Model 2 will consist of a logistical regression such that: 
Logged odds of success (NH vote %) =   +  ̂₁(media tone) +  ̂₂(volume) +  ̂₃(name 
recognition) +  ̂₄(previous office) +  ̂ (scandal) +  ̂ (party ID) ( 6 ) 





CHAPTER 5: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
As Table 5-1 shows, the correlations among campaign contributions, volume of 
media coverage and percentage in polls range between  0.491 and 0.587, which comport 
with Donovan and Hunsaker’s (2009) findings and, according to the classifications of 
Salkind (2014), can at best be described as “moderate relationship[s].” It is important to 
note that these data are aggregated across the entire set of primary elections. Certainly no 
causal conclusions should be made from this data. However, the lack of higher correlation 
values (especially between money and media coverage) does, at the very least, question the 
conclusiveness of findings that the media are merely reactive to financial disclosures. 
Certainly, a reactive media would result in much higher values.  
 
Table 5-1: Aggregated Correlation (Pearson’s r) 
Contributions Media (volume) Poll %
Contributions 1
Media (volume) 0.587 1




What remains to be estimated are the regressions for each of the models. Yet some 
interesting findings can be elicited from a cursory analysis of the raw data. On initial 
observation, the raw data (see Table 5-2) indicate that in the 10 primaries analyzed, on 
only one occasion did the candidate with the highest positive media coverage rating (tone) 
win their respective party’s New Hampshire primary (which was Al Gore in 2000). The 
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implications of this finding are even greater in light of the fact that in the 2000 Democratic 
primary, only two declared candidates were in the race—a statistical toss-up. Conversely, 
three out of the 10 New Hampshire primary winners actually received the most negative 
coverage during the pre-primary process.  
 
Table 5-2: New Hampshire Primary Results—quality/quantity media (1988-2012) 
1988 (Dem) 1988 (Rep) 1992 (Dem)
Dukakis* Bush* Tsongas*
Quality (+) Jackson Quality (+) Dole Quality (+) Brown
Quantity - Gephardt Quantity - Bush Quantity - Clinton
1996 (Rep) 2000 (Dem) 2000 (Rep)
Buchanan* Gore* McCain*
Quality (+) Dole Quality (+) Gore Quality (+) Bush
Quantity - Dole Quantity - Gore Quantity - Bush
2004 (Dem) 2008 (Dem) 2008 (Rep)
Kerry* Clinton* McCain*
Quality (+) Edwards Quality (+) Obama Quality (+) Romney
Quantity - Dean Quantity - Clinton Quantity - McCain
2012 (Rep) Scandals *NH primary winner
Romney*
Quality (+) Perry '92 - Clinton (Dem)
Quantity - Romney
Data Results for Pre-primary season (1988-2012)
Bold indicates winner 
received highest 
quality/quantity  
Sources: New Hampshire Dept. of State (sos.nh.gov), Gallup, Vanderbilt Television News Archive 
 
As Table 5-3 shows, the correlation between tone of media coverage and results of 
the New Hampshire primary is only 0.11—essentially a non-existent relationship. 
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Furthermore, when tone was correlated with all other variables, no relationship attained a 
value higher than 0.20. Such findings, although they do not confirm or invalidate claims of 
the existence of media bias, certainly call into question the effectiveness of that bias. 
Essentially, even if the media portray certain candidates in a negative tone, such tactics do 
not appear to be effective. 
 
Table 5-3: Correlation Between Tone of Media Coverage and NH Primary Result 
 
 
Regarding quantity of coverage, Table 5-2 shows that five candidates with the 
highest overall media coverage eventually claimed victory in New Hampshire. Additionally, 
although not shown in Table 5-2, for the five remaining elections, all five candidates who 
had the highest quantity of media coverage placed second in New Hampshire, with Clinton 
in 1992, and Bush in 2000 eventually winning  the presidency (although such 
extrapolations to the general election are not analyzed here). Therefore, ceteris paribus, 
having the highest total quantity of media coverage during the pre-primary season 
correlates with all 10 candidates either placing first or second in the New Hampshire 
primary.  
Furthermore, the data show that three candidates with the second highest total 
quantity of media coverage eventually were victorious in New Hampshire (Buchanan in 
Media Tone NH Result
Media Tone 1
NH Result 0.1131 1
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1996, McCain in 2000, and Kerry in 2004). In sum, candidates who earn either the most or 
second most total media coverage during the pre-primary season account for 80 percent of 
the first or second place positions in the New Hampshire primaries from 1988 to 2012, 
regardless of the tone of the coverage. Certainly, as Gary Hart in 1984 and Herman Cain in 
2012 can attest to, that is not to say that negative coverage fails to have deleterious effects 
on a campaign. As Table 5-2 also notes, Bill Clinton was the only candidate to survive a 
scandal and make it to the primary stage of an election. There is no doubt the moniker, 
“Comeback Kid” is apropos (Dann 2008).  
The effect of previous election to office at first glance seems to correlate with 
success in the New Hampshire primary (see Table 5-4). In fact, only Pat Buchanan was able 
to claim victory in New Hampshire without previously holding an elected position. Yet, 
when the entire field of 50 cases is analyzed, causality appears to be supplanted by 
statistical odds. A total of 43 candidates previously held a prominent elected office as 




Table 5-4: Previously Elected Candidates 
 
When running for the highest office in the land, previous elected experience could 
be regarded as a pre-requisite. With such a high percentage of the total candidates having 
elected experience, the odds are high that the winner will have previous elected 
experience. From time to time, an outsider or single-issue advocate candidate will make a 
run for the presidency. None have yet found the success that the politically experienced 
candidates tend to garner. 
Regarding the qualitative data, Table 5-5 shows the effects of media coverage and 
polling preference on money raised. The results show that, in each quarter, the effect of 
1988 (Dem) NPE* 1996 (Rep) NPE* 2004 (Dem) NPE* 2008 (Dem) NPE*
Dukakis Dole Kerry Obama
Jackson x Alexander Dean Clinton
Gore Buchanan Edwards Edwards
Gephardt Forbes x Kucinich Kucinich
Simon Keyes x Lieberman Richardson
Lugar Clark x
1988 (Rep) NPE* 2012 (Rep) NPE*
Bush 2000 (Rep) NPE* 2008 (Rep) NPE* Romney
Dole Bush McCain Santorum
Kemp Bauer x Romney Paul
duPont Forbes x Huckabee Gingrich
Robertson Keyes x Paul Huntsman
McCain Thompson






*Not previously elected to any office
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media coverage on money raised reaches statistically significant levels. While in the second 
quarter, polling preference reaches significance, it does not hold for the third and fourth 
quarters.  
Table 5-5: Effects of Media Coverage and Poll Preference on Money Raised (2SLS) 






















The effect, then, that media coverage has on money raised is clarified in Table 5-6. 
For each story that is broadcast, a candidate can expect an increase in financial support of 
$148,000 in the second quarter, $109,000 in the third quarter, and $97,000 in the fourth 
quarter (all values are in 2012 dollars).  Therefore, H₁ is supported. It is important to note 
that these data do not include campaign advertisements. They are limited to broadcast and 












It is interesting to note that, as time goes by, the value, and thus, financial effect that 
the media have on campaign coffers, diminishes. One seemingly constant conclusion would 
be that, as the election cycle progresses, prospective voters are both becoming more aware 
and more certain of candidates. As has been discussed, earlier in the season fewer pre-
conceived notions of candidates exist, and, thus, greater reliance is placed on the media to 
inform the voting public. As the pre-primary season ends and the primary season begins, 
voters are now becoming more confident in their independent opinions of various 
candidates. 
A second aspect of this trend involves the sheer volume of media coverage that is 
produced in the latter stages of the early season—specifically the fourth quarter of the 
year. A simple calculation using the raw data (see Appendix A) finds that slightly over 50% 
of the total media coverage for the entirety of the years analyzed was broadcast in the 
fourth quarter. Effectively, the total individual contribution amounts will necessarily reach 
a relative ceiling, regardless of media coverage. This further supports the theory that the 
media’s effect is maximized earlier in the process. 
Table 5-7 shows the effects of media coverage and campaign contributions on 
polling preference, measured quarterly. For the second quarter, the effect of media 
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coverage on polling preference reaches statistically significant levels. However, in the third 
quarter, media coverage loses significance, as money raised now becomes statistically 
significant. Finally, as the year ends, both variables lose their significance. The results 
indicate that, for each story broadcast during the second quarter of the year, a candidate 
can expect an increase in polling preference of .3% over that timeframe.  
As with any statistical finding, this measurement should not be misconstrued as 
absolute and boundless. As previously noted, quarterly values of polling are highly 
correlated and, thus, dependent upon the previous quarterly value. However, because the 
two-stage regression provides instrumented variables to account for the endogeneity, the 
.3% value applies to a direct measure in the change in media coverage from the previous 




Table 5-7: Effects of Media Coverage and Money Raised on Poll Preference (2SLS) 

























Again, it would appear that there is something to be said for the effects of media coverage 
on potential voters early on in the pre-primary season. However, that effect appears to 
diminish as the primary season draws closer. Therefore, H₂ is supported with a time-bound 
caveat. 
It is important to note that, prior to the application of the instrumental lagged 
variable in Model 1, the independent variable of media coverage shows high levels of 
correlation with the dependent variable of money raised (between 0.717 and 0.793 for 
each quarter). These high levels support the use of the two-stage least squares regression. 
After the instrumental variables are applied, the correlation values drop to the moderate 
values noted previously. 
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The final two hypotheses address the predictive powers of the data on success in 
New Hampshire.  Table 5-8 provides the results of the logistical regression using the three 
main variables of media coverage, campaign contributions, and polling preference as well 
as the aforementioned control variables. What is noticeable from the outset is that no 
coefficient estimate attained statistical significance. Furthermore, the odds ratios for most 
variables do not show much of an effect over the value of 1, indicating that, even had they 
gained a statistically significant value, the odds of success would not necessarily increase to 
a point that would give a candidate victory in New Hampshire. In fact, most of the results 
do not approach a level of statistical significance on which they could be relied for their 
predictive values.  
 
Table 5-8: Effects on Chance of Success in New Hampshire Primary 
Std. Err. Sig. Std. Err. Sig.
0.018 0.298 0.007 0.6
0.058 0.215 0.055 0.551
0.037 0.699 0.043 0.178
n/a n/a 4.32 0.669





























The data in model 2 (as well as the correlation in Table 5-3) do not support H₃ as 
tone of coverage clearly has no effect on success in New Hampshire. Regarding H₄, the data 
are again clear—as far as a direct relationship between total quantity of coverage and a 
measurable increase in the chance of success in New Hampshire and controlling for all 
relevant variables, the hypothesis is not supported.  
That is not to say that media coverage does not have any impact as it relates to 
success in New Hampshire. As shown above, there exists a strong statistically significant 
relationship between media coverage and campaign contributions. Furthermore, those 
presidential candidates who eventually find success in New Hampshire do so while almost 
always accruing the highest total media coverage during the pre-primary season. The data 
here merely limit the extent to which total volume of coverage can effectively provide a 





CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
While the media play a specific and necessary role during presidential elections, the 
effect they have is heightened during the primary process and, even more so in the pre-
primary season when a large majority of potential voters are not yet attuned to the election 
process (Patterson 1980, 68; Belt, Just, and Crigler, 2012). The effects of this condition 
create a hierarchy of the candidates so that, as the primary season advances, prospective 
voters are introduced to candidates already labeled as viable or non-viable, thus heavily 
affecting the outcome of early season contests. Concluding his research, Bartels (1993, 275) 
admits that, in his limited analysis of the effects of media exposure on voting opinions, 
“considerably longer time periods” are required. The research performed here is a step in 
that direction. 
The initial data suggest that the role of the media in this early pre-primary season is 
important, as a common factor in successful candidates in New Hampshire is the quantity 
of media coverage that they garnered over the year. This partially supports Benoit, 
Hemmer and Stein’s (2005) findings that volume of media coverage affects voters’ 
perceptions of candidates (261). However, it should be noted that their conclusion also 
included tone of coverage as a statistically significant effect—which has been clearly 
refuted here both in the raw data as well as the quantitative analysis.  
Arguably the most interesting finding in this research is the diminishing effect that 
media coverage has on campaign contributions over time. The direct dollar value per media 
story decreased from the second quarter to the third and from the third quarter to the 
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fourth. One theory that might serve to explain the observed phenomenon is that, in the 
earliest phase of the pre-primary season, voters “[know] the least” about candidates and, 
therefore, rely more heavily on the media for queues (Buell 1991, 150). As the season 
moves closer to the primaries, voters not only begin paying more attention to the 
campaign, but also are beginning to cement their own opinions about candidates, such that 
the effects of media coverage actually diminish as the election draws closer.  
The media’s continual desire for stories that are new, exciting, or groundbreaking 
often lead them to focus more time on some candidates and less on others. For those who 
may doubt this reality, simply consider the example of John Edwards. As a white, male 
candidate in a primary battling both a female candidate and an African-American 
candidate, Edwards’ early polling was not too far behind Barack Obama. Yet, the media 
coverage that he garnered remained essentially half of what either Obama or Hillary 
Clinton drew throughout the early primary season. Clearly, newsworthiness is subjective, 
yet it remains a substantial factor in deciding who or what to cover.  
Some have rightly argued that the influence and, therefore, validity of conclusions 
based solely on television media coverage fail to account for the meteoric rise in internet-
based media. And while this is certainly true, television, arguably for the time being—and 
undoubtedly for the time bound data measured here—remains a significant source of 
political information for a large portion of the voting public. As one New York Times 
reporter noted, “television is the ultimate recovered-memory therapy, imposing an ordered 
narrative to diverse, dispersed moments… [such that] an isolated segment, shown over and 
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over again, can distill, oversimplify and in some cases distort” (Stanley 2011). Howard 
Dean’s post-Iowa scream is a case in point. 
Future research may focus on improving the data collection methods that account 
for the growing effects of web-based media as well as addressing the impact of PAC money 
and advertising. These are factors not included in this research and may perhaps account 
for the failure of some of the coefficient estimates to reach statistically significant 
predictive findings. Furthermore, taking this analysis forward into the primary season 
could prove beneficial to predictive research; however, such attempts must be executed 
with caution as the primary season would seem to be much more volatile given the 
frontloading trend which finds states continually pushing up their primary dates earlier in 
an effort to increase their impact on the remaining contests in other states.  
Taken with the extant research, which is ever-searching for ways to improve 
predictive models of election outcomes, the research here provides a key aspect in 
comprehensive estimate models that more accurately explain factors in voter behavior and, 
ultimately, voter choice. As Donovan and Hunsaker (2009, 49) found, results in the New 
Hampshire primary are strong predictors of future primary success – especially when 
compared to the Iowa caucus. Prediction, after all, is the elusive third step of the science of 
politics, preceded by description and explanation. This research will further assist in 
attaining that goal as it relates to presidential elections in the United States.  
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Table A-1 Primary Data, 1987-1999 










Bush 0 1987 4.36 6.9 3.2 12.87 39 46 108
Dole 0 1987 1.782 2.9 3.9 12.67 22 52 120
Kemp 0 1987 0 3.1 2.8 3.76 9 23 35
duPont 0 1987 2.57 0.9 1.1 2.57 0 1 19
Roberston 0 1987 0 0 11.1 9.5 7 15 34
Dukakis 1 1987 0 4.2 3.5 4.95 16 23 45
Gephardt 1 1987 1 1.1 1.2 5.35 24 22 52
Simon 1 1987 0 0.9 1 2.97 15 15 41
Jackson 1 1987 0 0 1 1.98 20 31 41
Gore 1 1987 0 1.4 1.3 2.18 11 20 27
Tsongas 1 1991 0 0.84 1.27 0.46 7 14 28
Clinton 1 1991 0 0 5.45 1.5 7 16 59
Kerrey 1 1991 0 0 0 1.23 0 5 42
Harkin 1 1991 0 0 3.28 0.43 3 17 36
Brown 1 1991 0 0 0.86 0.32 0 7 24
Buchanan 0 1995 1.39 1.271 2.093 3.57 6 11 33
Dole 0 1995 6.02 8.723 8.724 8.18 92 88 215
Alexander 0 1995 7.52 2.325 1.073 2.14 1 11 30
Forbes 0 1995 0 0 0.009 2.21 0 6 38
Lugar 0 1995 0.62 2.459 0.863 0.99 8 6 14
Keyes 0 1995 0 0.056 0.506 1.24 0 2 6
Gore 1 1999 11.99 8.655 6.754 5.25 29 51 82
Bradley 1 1999 5.8 7.416 7.306 11.34 7 30 75
McCain 0 1999 2.27 2.441 2.953 8.41 12 14 85
Bush 0 1999 10.09 28.753 19.672 13.38 25 40 98
Forbes 0 1999 0.02 2.722 1.538 1.44 0 8 34
Keyes 0 1999 0 0 0.579 1.43 0 0 15






Table A-2: Primary Data, 2003-2011 










Kerry 1 2003 8.56 5.815 3.85 2.8 18 40 153
Dean 1 2003 3.22 7.597 14.801 19.19 22 37 208
Clark 1 2003 0 0 3.491 12.5 4 31 106
Edwards 1 2003 9.05 4.494 2.089 2.118 8 20 93
Lieberman 1 2003 3.62 5.127 3.619 2.63 9 31 106
Kucinich 1 2003 0.21 1.537 1.651 1.65 0 9 24
Clinton 1 2007 28.01 26.997 27.228 29.04 126 166 240
Obama 1 2007 27.89 32.889 20.652 24.79 97 133 234
Edwards 1 2007 15.22 9.028 7.092 5.24 56 77 146
Richardson 1 2007 6.71 7.016 5.259 4.23 25 14 29
Kucinich 1 2007 0.37 0.785 1.026 1.86 11 9 11
McCain 0 2007 13.8 11.26 5.698 7.42 88 67 130
Romney 0 2007 22.61 14.061 9.803 9.84 59 88 166
Huckabee 0 2007 0.57 0.764 1.038 7.21 13 20 141
Giuliani 0 2007 0.69 2.366 5.233 15.38 73 93 153
Paul 0 2007 0 0 12.815 21.66 9 68 63
Thompson 0 2007 15.93 17.47 12.71 9.68 33 93 147
Romney 0 2011 0 18.234 14.068 24.084 58 73 164
Paul 0 2011 0 4.536 7.672 13.317 19 16 60
Huntsman 0 2011 0 0 2.218 1.097 16 15 29
Santorum 0 2011 0 0.581 0.631 0.915 11 11 62












Table B-1: Secondary Data, 1987-1999 
Name April % July % Oct % Dec % NH (pos) NH % Nameᶧ Officeᶺ




Bush 34 49 39 40 1 38 93 1 -10 0
Dole 18 27 21 19 2 29 90 1 8 0
Kemp 9 13 8 9 3 13 83 1 8 0
duPont 2 1 1 2 4 10 63 0 -5 0
Roberston 4 8 5 8 5 9 85 0 -3 0
Dukakis 7 11 13 8 1 36 17 1 5 0
Gephardt 6 7 6 4 2 20 15 1 5 0
Simon 0 7 7 6 3 17 45 1 5 0
Jackson 27 18 19 16 4 8 91 0 19 0
Gore 6 5 8 4 5 7 22 1 0 0
Tsongas 1 4 4 9 1 33.2 47 1 24 0
Clinton 1 5 6 42 2 24.8 25 1 -18 1
Kerrey 0 0 0 10 3 11.1 26 1 6 0
Harkin 0 4 7 9 4 10.1 48 1 4 0
Brown 0 6 15 16 5 8.1 81 1 40 0
Buchanan 8 5 7 4 1 27.3 90 0 -12 0
Dole 46 51 31 34 2 26.2 96 1 -8 0
Alexander 3 3 2 2 3 22.6 33 1 -22 0
Forbes 0 0 3 5 4 12.2 24 0 -32 0
Lugar 5 3 1 1 5 5.2 16 1 0 0
Keyes 1 1 0 1 6 2.7 20 0 0 0
Gore 54 64 51 52 1 50 92 1 32 0
Bradley 34 28 39 38 2 46 67 1 2 0
McCain 5 5 8 17 1 49 56 1 20 0
Bush 53 59 60 60 2 30 95 1 26 0
Forbes 0 6 4 9 3 13 84 0 10 0
Keyes 0 0 3 4 4 6 32 0 0 0







Table B-2: Secondary Data, 2003-2011 
Name April % July % Oct % Dec % NH (pos) NH % Nameᶧ Officeᶺ




Kerry 17 13 10 7 1 38.4 68 1 28 0
Dean 6 6 13 22 2 26.3 58 1 14 0
Clark 0 0 19 17 3 12.4 58 0 34 0
Edwards 9 7 5 7 4 12.1 58 1 72 0
Lieberman 23 20 12 10 5 8.6 83 1 44 0
Kucinich 3 1 3 2 6 1.4 35 1 12 0
Clinton 38 29 47 45 1 39.1 96 1 -11 0
Obama 19 30 26 27 2 36.5 76 1 31 0
Edwards 15 11 11 15 3 16.9 79 1 -6 0
Richardson 2 3 4 2 4 4.6 60 1 -3 0
Kucinich 0 0 1 2 5 1.3 56 1 -3 0
McCain 16 19 16 14 1 37.7 82 1 -36 0
Romney 6 12 9 14 2 32.2 42 1 3 0
Huckabee 1 2 7 16 3 11.4 47 1 20 0
Giuliani 38 32 32 27 4 8.7 85 1 -9 0
Paul 2 1 2 3 5 7.8 56 1 20 0
Thompson 10 11 20 14 6 1.2 69 1 42 0
Romney 13 27 20 22 1 39.4 83 1 -1 0
Paul 6 8 8 8 2 22.8 76 1 4 0
Huntsman 1 2 2 2 3 16.8 21 1 4 0
Santorum 2 6 18 4 4 9.5 42 1 -3 0
















Table C-1: Variables and Descriptions 
 






















Gallup                                                                                                                                
(The Gallup Polls, 1988-2012)










Federal Election Commission (line 17a, 
Form 3) (www.fec.gov)








Vanderbilt News Archive 
(http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/)




Initial % at/near 
Yes/No
Yes/No
Vanderbilt TV archive 
(http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/)





















4Q April % July % Oct % Dec %
Mean 4.274 5.235 5.167 7.014 23.18 33.96 81.4 11.18 12.82 13.26 14.84
S.E. 1.004 1.08 0.839 1.003 4.09 5.037 9.044 2.057 2.21 1.979 2.038
Median 0.595 2.345 3.076 3.995 11.5 20 59.5 6 6.5 8 9
Mode 0 0 1 1.24 0 11 34 0 0 7 2
S.D. 7.104 7.636 5.933 7.097 28.926 35.623 63.952 14.549 15.631 13.993 14.415
Sample Var. 50.471 58.32 35.204 50.375 836.72 1269.02 4089.96 211.701 244.35 195.828 207.81
Kurtosis 4.022 4.855 3.677 1.546 3.26 3.407 -0.131 1.854 2.988 2.524 1.489
Skewness 2.091 2.238 1.901 1.436 1.901 1.801 0.918 1.645 1.851 1.7 1.434
Range 28.01 32.889 27.228 28.72 126 166 234 54 64 60 59
Minimum 0 0 0 0.32 0 0 6 0 0 0 1
Maximum 28.01 32.889 27.228 29.04 126 166 240 54 64 60 60
Sum 213.74 261.753 258.39 350.73 1159 1698 4070 559 641 663 742
Count 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
95.0% level 2.019 2.17 1.686 2.017 8.22 10.124 18.175 4.135 4.442 3.977 4.096
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